The complex interaction between intellectual property (IP) and antitrust law has variously been called a conflict, an intersection, a relationship, a tension, an interaction, an interface, and most simply, "and." The early view of the relationship between the two emphasized the conflict between (to oversimplify in both directions) a law that grants monopolies and a law that forbids them. But beginning in the 1970s, that view was challenged by Ward Bowman and others, who argued that both IP and antitrust law serve the long-run goal of efficiency, albeit in different ways.
In fact, however, the situation is more complex still. A wealth of economic evidence suggests that innovation is far from a unitary phenomenon. More specifically, innovation differs dramatically by industry. Dan Burk and I have explored this in detail in a recent book; the reader is referred there for a discussion of the evidence. 8 
Pharmaceuticals and Schumpeterian Innovation
To see the scope of the problem, think about the very different characteristics of just two industries: small-molecule chemistry and Internet business methods.
Schumpeterian prospect theory is based on the premise that strong IP rights should be given to a single coordinating entrepreneur. Prospect theory envisions invention as something done by a single firm, rather than collectively; as the result of significant expenditure on research, rather than the result of serendipity or casual experimentation; and as only the first step in a long and expensive process of bringing a product to market, rather than as an activity close to a final product. 9 The prospect vision of patents maps most closely onto invention in the pharmaceutical industry. Pharmaceutical innovation is notoriously expensive and time-consuming. The Prospect theory follows Joseph Schumpeter in distinguishing between the act of invention, which creates a new product or process, and the broader act of innovation, which includes the work necessary to revise, develop, and bring that new product or process to commercial fruition. As a result, prospect theory suggests that patents should be broad, stand alone, and confer almost total control over subsequent uses of the product. pharmaceutical industry reports that it spends as much as $800 million on research and development (R&D) (including product development) for each new drug produced. Patents also map well onto products in the pharmaceutical industry. As a general rule, the scope of patents in the pharmaceutical industry tends to be coextensive with the products actually sold. Pharmaceutical patents do not merely cover small components that must be integrated into a marketable product, and this in turn means that a company that wishes to sell a pharmaceutical product generally won't need licenses for many different patents. All of these factors suggest that innovation in the pharmaceutical industry requires strong patent rights. 18 In the pharmaceutical industry, there is no serious problem of either cumulative or complementary innovation. Strong patent rights are necessary to encourage drug companies to expend large sums of money on research years before the product can be released to the market. And because much of the work occurs after the drug is first identified, it is important to give patentees the right to coordinate downstream changes to the drug so they can recoup the costs of that additional work. Some empirical evidence supports this result.
Patents in the chemical and pharmaceutical industries were more likely to be licensed ex ante--a central facet of prospect theory--than patents in any other field.
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The Internet and Competitive Innovation
Prospect theory works in the pharmaceutical industry.
The theory of competitive (or at least imperfectly competitive) innovation focuses on the incentives companies have to innovate even if they do not hold a monopoly position and are unlikely to acquire one through innovation. This approach emphasizes the fact that many inventions do not require substantial and sustained R&D expenditures; they may be relatively simple ideas or discoveries happened upon serendipitously. It is also premised on competition's role in improving products and on the existence of other incentives to innovate, such as lead time or government research funding. And it worries that strong patent rights will stifle subsequent generations of innovation, locking the world into version 1.0 of a product -fine, in droves to try to control various aspects of the Internet.
Competitive innovation theory suggests that ownership is not a necessary prerequisite to innovation, and indeed that it is sometimes inimical to innovation. Patent protection is not always appropriate, particularly where expected R&D cost is small, where the ratio of innovator cost to imitator costs is small, or where first-mover advantages or network effects can provide the needed incentives. Under these conditions, patents should be rare and very modest in scope, in order to allow market forces their fullest latitude. Competitive innovation theory fits business methods, arguably fits the Internet, and--at least in the 1970s--fit software.
_______
In sum, then, the problem then is not simply that we must choose between a monopolybased and a competition-based theory of innovation. It is that the right answer will differ depending on the industry, and on the nature of the invention within each industry.
In our book, Dan Burk and I suggested that the way for patent law to deal with the industry-specific nature of both innovation and the role of patents in that innovation was to treat inventions in different industries differently.
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If antitrust as well as IP serves the goal of innovation policy, and if antitrust as well as IP varies in its efficacy by industry, the question is whether antitrust as well as IP law should be We argued not for industry-specific patent statutes -those are likely to suffer from a host of rent-seeking and definitional problems -but for a nominally unitary set of legal standards that can be applied differently in different technologies and different industries. 27 Burk & Lemley, The Patent Crisis, supra note __, at __.
industry-specific. I suggest that it should. In particular, I think courts should take the importance of competition in promoting innovation into account in setting IP-antitrust policy.
Antitrust law is almost entirely a creature of the courts. While it is based on animating statutes, they set out only the most basic of principles. It has fallen to the courts to articulate even the most fundamental antitrust rules. And in doing so, both the courts and the agencies have applied what Dan Burk and I call "micro policy levers." That is, they have focused on the economic characteristics of the individual industry before them. Antitrust cases in the software industry focus on network effects and the dominance they produce; antitrust cases in the pharmaceutical industry focus on potential competition and the barriers to entry that result from entry regulation; antitrust cases in the hospital industry focus on the complex web of relationships between hospitals and medical practice groups. This industry specificity results from the nature of antitrust, which -far more than patent law -is concerned with the particular economic characteristics of both the practice being regulated and the market in which the practice occurs.
Indeed, the industry-specific nature of the antitrust inquiry is so ingrained that government antitrust authorities organize themselves along industry lines. The Federal Trade
Commission and the DOJ Antitrust Division divide authority, not along doctrinal lines (mergers to one agency, monopolization to another), but by parceling authority over some industries to each agency. And within the Antitrust Division, authority is further divided within the civil sections by industry group. This institutional structure reflects the fact that knowing an industry in detail is often more important in antitrust law than knowing a particular body of law in detail.
It should be no surprise, then, that antitrust law has begun to develop industry-specific rules at both a macro-and a micro-level. While some such rules are legislated -the exemptions for the insurance industry and for railroads are obvious examples -others are judicially created.
The D.C. Circuit created a separate tying doctrine just for computer operating systems. 28 The courts long ago created a separate set of legal rules to deal with collective bargaining by labor unions. 29 And courts have sometimes applied expressly industry-specific doctrines to heavilyregulated industries like pharmaceuticals, banking, and telecommunications.
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Besides these macro policy levers, courts have applied nominally neutral antitrust doctrines in different ways in different industries. Mergers are treated differently in shrinking industries than in growing ones. 31 Health care seems to have developed its own body of case law that interacts very little with cases in other industries.
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When it comes to IP, however, that contextual, industry-specific approach to antitrust law seems to disappear. Antitrust law defers to patent law within the scope of the patent right, If I am right that the relationship between market structure and innovation is industryspecific, we need a more nuanced innovation policy. We should have strong patent rights in circumstances in which we believe Schumpeter is right and innovation requires investment or reward that cannot be achieved in a competitive market. But we should have strong antitrust policy in circumstances in which we believe Arrow is right and it is competition rather than monopoly that will drive innovation.
The result is that it is patent law, not antitrust law, that determines how innovation will be protected.
If patent law were properly calibrated to the characteristics of different industries, it might get us to this goal as a practical matter. Since antitrust policies the boundaries of the patent right, antitrust may expand in precisely those circumstances in which patent law recedes. So if patent law properly steps back in industries in which monopoly is not necessary or desirable to promote innovation, antitrust law might be expected to rush in. Certainly that ebb-and-flow relationship has happened throughout history, with antitrust growing stronger in the eras in which patent law grows weaker. because it led to cycles of over-and under-protection.
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The harder question is how antitrust law should react when patent law gets this balance wrong. Understanding antitrust law as a promoter of innovation within its own domain argues, I think, for a more affirmative role for antitrust. Antitrust should be more willing to confront patent law directly in those industries in which we are confident that competition rather than monopoly spurs innovation and in which patent law has not recognized that fact.
But if we could harness that relationship on an industry-specific basis, it might lead, not to vacillation between all-patent and all-antitrust eras, but to areas of patent primacy and areas of antitrust primacy. 367 (1999) . But because those arguments depend on other theories than the role of antitrust in promoting innovation, I do not discuss them further here.
